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This study investigates the use of coercive investigation powers in the 
context of corporate crime, based on a series of interviews with 
former Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’) 
enforcement officials and corporate lawyers. It argues that ASIC’s 
powers are well equipped to investigate corporate crime, but that 
ASIC rarely exercises these powers. In this respect, the article draws 
similar conclusions to the recent Royal Commission into Misconduct 
in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry, but 
delves further, revealing how coercive powers are used and why they 
are seldom exercised in corporate criminal investigations. In 
accounting for this institutional failure, this study implicates a 
neoliberal agenda of deregulation and austerity that has permitted 
the regulator to be ‘captured’ by wealthy and powerful regulatees. 
The analysis is informed by a critical regulation approach to 
corporate crime that explains corporate or ‘white-collar’ crime and 
its enforcement through a sociological lens: as a result of unequal 
social relationships, primarily that of social class, that create 
disparities in legal and political power. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
In the post-war period, liberal democracies have vested officials from 
regulatory agencies with ‘special’ or coercive investigative powers. These powers 
bypass traditional civil liberties such as the right to silence and privilege against 
self-incrimination.1 This has largely occurred in a law enforcement context that is 
mostly defined by wealthy and powerful interests or ‘regulatees’ – individual and 
 
*  The author, Dr Eugene Schofield-Georgeson, is a lecturer at the University of Technology (UTS) Faculty 
of Law. The author extends his thanks and gratitude to each interview participant in this study for sharing 
their valuable insights and experience – without which this article would not have been possible. 
1  Administrative Review Council, The Coercive Information-Gathering Powers of Government Agencies 
(Report No 48, 1 May 2008) 5, 71–93 (‘ARC’); Australian Law Reform Commission, Traditional Rights 
and Freedoms: Encroachments by Commonwealth Laws (Report No 129, 23 December 2015) 309–11. 
The right of silence is a separate and distinct immunity to the privilege against self-incrimination and 
each have different historical origins: R v Director of Serious Fraud Office; Ex parte Smith [1993] AC 1, 
30–1 (Lord Mustill) cited in Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 
CLR 477, 503 (Mason CJ and Toohey J). 
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corporate – endowed to resist law and regulation. Precisely how ‘extraordinary’ 
powers are used in this context, and to what effect, has scarcely been the subject 
of scholarly research. Despite a large-scale and recent Australian Royal 
Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial 
Services Industry (‘the Banking Royal Commission’) recommending more white-
collar prosecutions,2 the role that coercive powers play in the prosecution process 
remains largely unexplored. 
This article examines the use of coercive powers in the investigation of 
corporate crime by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(‘ASIC’), a regulatory agency, through analysis of interviews with former ASIC 
enforcement officials and corporate lawyers. It argues that ASIC’s powers are well 
equipped to investigate corporate crime but that ASIC rarely exercises these 
powers. This article first examines why ASIC’s powers are well ‘assimilated’, 
meaning that they enable the regulator to target and police white-collar crime as 
effectively as regular police powers (Part A ‘Assimilation and Efficacy of ASIC’s 
Special Powers to Investigate Corporate Crime’). Second, this article reveals how 
coercive powers are ‘differentiated’, or rather, why ASIC investigators rarely use 
their powers to prosecute corporate crime, as police do against regular crime (Part 
B ‘Differentiation and Under-Enforcement of Corporate Crime Relating to ASIC’s 
Special Powers’).3 In this respect, the article delves further than the findings of the 
Banking Royal Commission, engaging with the institutional causes of enforcement 
failure. The most significant implicate a neoliberal agenda of deregulation and 
austerity, affecting funding, staffing, skills and formal enforcement policy within 
the regulator, thereby facilitating white-collar crime by permitting the regulator’s 
‘capture’ by wealthy and powerful regulatees. The analysis is informed by a 
critical regulation approach4 to corporate crime that explains corporate or ‘white-
collar’ crime and its enforcement through a sociological lens: as a result of unequal 
social relationships, primarily that of social class, that create disparities in legal 
and political power. 
ASIC’s coercive powers of investigation are not without controversy5 and the 
necessity of these powers, compared to regular police powers, is discussed at 
 
2  Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry 
(Final Report, 1 February 2019) vol 1 446 Recommendation 6.2 (‘Banking Royal Commission’). 
3  Where indictable offences are concerned, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’), 
not ASIC, is required to make the final decision to prosecute an offence in court (state and territory DPPs 
are required to do the same): Australian Securities and Investment Commission and Commonwealth 
Director of Public Prosecutions, ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (1 March 2006) [4.1]–[4.3] cited in 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2004] NSWSC 1089, [53]. Nevertheless, 
ASIC investigators must make a decision to initiate the prosecution process through the gathering of 
evidence to prove an offence (in a similar manner to state and territory police forces). 
4  Steve Tombs and Dave Whyte, Safety Crimes (Willan Publishing, 2007); Harry Glasbeek, Capitalism: A 
Crime Story (Between the Lines, 2018); Frank Pearce and Steve Tombs, Toxic Capitalism: Corporate 
Crime and the Chemical Industry (Dartmouth Publishing, 1998). It draws on the theoretical explanation 
of corporate crime, pioneered by North American sociologist, Ed Sutherland, in the 1940s: see below Part 
II.  
5  Strong arguments against these powers have, for instance, been voiced in Jeremy Gans, Submission No 
77 to Australian Law Reform Commission, Freedoms Inquiry (2015), as well as in the dissenting views 
of Senators Barney Cooney, Ian Campbell and Frank Ford MP in Joint Statutory Committee on 
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length in Part A(4) of this article through the concept of ‘assimilation’. Before 
analysing this concept in detail, however, the necessity of these powers warrants 
brief explanation. Corporate crime is unlike conventional crime in a range of ways. 
It often involves complex facts and is difficult to detect, requiring wide powers to 
demand production of documentary evidence essential to its prosecution. Unlike 
other crime, the immediate victim of corporate offending is often indeterminate: 
society at large, a broad group of customers or investors, or the corporation itself. 
In this respect, the corporation is an inanimate legal fiction often controlled by the 
perpetrator. Unlike human victims and witnesses to a crime of theft, within 
corporations, witnesses to complex fraud are frequently non-existent, necessitating 
respective powers to compel oral evidence from suspects.6 Without such powers, 
ASIC could not achieve its regulatory objectives of ensuring confidence in the 
integrity of Australian financial markets while enforcing compliance with 
regulatory law while deterring its breach.7 Failing to enforce the law in this context 
results in a general perception of bias or unfairness as to the class-based nature of 
law enforcement – a perception of lawlessness that undermines the market itself. 
According to current economic orthodoxy, loss of investor and creditor confidence 
in market regulation, for instance, might result in a shift of global capital to other 
jurisdictions that uphold the rule of law.8 The Federal Court of Australia has 
recognised that such capital outflows could detrimentally affect the economic 
welfare of all Australians.9    
 
II THE LITERATURE 
The use of coercive investigation powers against white-collar crime is a topic 
that requires explanation by reference to an interdisciplinary literature, drawing 
upon scholarship in the fields of corporate, criminal and evidence law, as well as 
regulation theory and criminology. Absent from much of this literature is a critical 
and detailed analysis of structural and institutional relationships involving social 
power. Power, of course, is implicit within law enforcement against ‘the crimes of 
the powerful’.10 As critical regulation scholars such as Frank Pearce, Harry 
Glasbeek, Steve Tombs and Dave Whyte make clear, class power is at the centre 
of corporate or white-collar crime and is the reason for its ‘regulation’, rather than 
 
Corporations and Securities, Parliament of Australia, Use Immunity Provisions in the Corporations Law 
and the Australian Securities Commission Law (1991), 31.  
6  Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities, Parliament of Australia, Use Immunity 
Provisions in the Corporations Law and the Australian Securities Commission Law (Final Report, 13 
November 1991) 26 [4.8] (‘Use Immunity Report’). 
7  Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1(2) (‘ASIC Act’). 
8  Bogdan Dima, Flavia Barna and Miruna-Lucia Nachescu, ‘Does Rule of Law Support the Capital 
Market?’ (2018) 31(1) Economic Research 461, 476; Laura Alfaro, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan and Vadym 
Volosovych, ‘Capital Flows in a Globalized World: The Role of Policies and Institutions’ (Working 
Paper No 11696, Conference on Capital Controls and Capital Flows in Emerging Economies: Policies, 
Practices and Consequences, National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2005).  
9  Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Whitebox Trading Pty Ltd [No 7] [2019] FCA 849, 
[16]–[19] (Yates J). 
10  Frank Pearce, The Crimes of the Powerful: Marxism, Crime and Deviance (Pluto Press, 1976).  
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its policing.11 According to these scholars, the resurgence of ruling-class power in 
the neoliberal era has been associated with more recent ‘deregulated’ enforcement 
policies of ‘compliance’ and ‘self-regulation’, as opposed to criminalisation, 
deterrence and prosecution.12  
Foremost among accounts of corporate or ‘white-collar’ crime is the work of 
Edwin Sutherland in the 1940s.13 Building on the work of French political 
economists Rusche and Kirchheimer in the 1930s,14 Sutherland developed a theory 
of corporate crime in which he understood the class-biased development and 
implementation as leading to corporate crime being treated differently to other 
kinds of crime, such as ‘blue-collar’ or ‘street’ crime.15 He called such crime ‘white 
collar crime’, which he defined as ‘a crime committed by a person of respectability 
and high social status in the course of his [sic] occupation’.16 Crucially, 
Sutherland’s definition extended beyond ‘individual characteristics’ pertaining to 
white-collar offenders (status, career, income, etc),17 straddling the social relations 
of corporate offending. ‘Powerful business and professional men’, wrote 
Sutherland, routinely commit crimes but escape detection and prosecution because 
of the class bias of courts and ‘the power of their class to influence the 
implementation and administration of the law’.18  
As important to Sutherland’s theory was his idea of a continuum in the 
administration and punishment of crime. At one end of the continuum are types of 
crime treated by the law as mala in se or inherently wrong – crimes against the 
person, drug offences and property offences (‘street crime’) – corresponding with 
methods of enforcement, for instance by police, that treat such offences as 
inherently bad. At the other end of the continuum are types of crime that Sutherland 
labelled, mala prohibita, meaning wrong because they are prohibited by law. 
These offences usually include corporate crime and other ‘regulatory offences’, 
most often ‘differentiated’ from street crime through their legal definition as ‘civil’ 
or ‘technical violations [of law] … [involving] no moral culpability’.19 
Enforcement of these offences is usually conducted by regulatory agencies.  
Since the time of Sutherland, this theory has had important implications for 
law-makers and legal theorists. First, it has meant that definitions of corporate 
 
11  Glasbeek (n 4); Pearce and Tombs (n 4); Tombs and Whyte (n 4). 
12  Glasbeek (n 4); Pearce and Tombs (n 4); Tombs and Whyte (n 4).  
13  Edwin Sutherland, ‘White-Collar Criminality’ (1940) 5(1) American Sociological Review 1; Edwin H 
Sutherland, White Collar Crime (Holt Reinhart and Winston, 1949). 
14  Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer, Punishment and Social Structure (Columbia University Press, 
1939).  
15  Sutherland, ‘White-Collar Criminality’ (n 13) 8.  
16  Edwin Sutherland, White Collar Crime: The Uncut Version (Yale University Press, 1983) 7. 
17  An ‘individual characteristics’ or Durkheimian approach to sociological understandings of the concept of 
social class – such as that adopted by Pierre Bourdieu (1976) and Guy Standing (2011) – is eschewed by 
Erik Olin Wright and others, who caution that it fails to account for social relations between classes 
(Weber), as well as their exploitative and oppressive consequences (Marx): Erik Olin Wright, 
Understanding Class (Verso, 2015) 3–13. In other words, such approaches avoid the issue of power.   
18  Sutherland, ‘White-Collar Criminality’ (n 13) 7, 9.  
19  Edwin H Sutherland, ‘Is “White Collar Crime” Crime?’ (1945) 10(2) American Sociological Review 132, 
139; Tombs and Whyte (n 4) 94–5. 
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crime must be expansive, such as that suggested by sociologists Frank Pearce and 
Steve Tombs, which includes20  
[i]llegal acts or omissions, punishable by the state under administrative, civil or 
criminal law, which are the result of deliberate decision making or culpable 
negligence within a legitimate formal organisation. These acts of omissions are 
based in legitimate, formal, business organisations, made in accordance with the 
normative goals, standard operating procedures, and/or cultural norms of the 
organisation, and are intended to benefit the corporation itself.21 
It is this definition of corporate crime that is deployed here. In the present 
context, the type of corporate crime investigated by ASIC predominantly involves 
contraventions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘Corporations Act’) in 
conjunction with the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The residual provisions of the 
Criminal Code (sections 3–5) prescribe ‘fault elements’ (negligence, recklessness, 
knowledge or intention) and ‘physical elements’ (acts or omissions) for all 
Commonwealth offences. These provisions apply to all offences outlined in the 
Corporations Act, unless expressly overridden by a legislative statement to the 
contrary (eg, that an offence is one of ‘strict liability’; or involves a fault element 
of ‘intentional dishonesty or recklessness’ (Corporations Act section 184)).22  
A second implication arising from Sutherland’s observation is that white-collar 
crime is differentiated from street crime by law and procedure. In translating this 
observation into meaningful law reform (and thereby bridging an ‘is-ought’ 
distinction in Sutherland’s theory),23 critical regulation scholars – predominantly 
in the field of corporate work health and safety crime24 – have suggested that 
progress in the field of corporate crime requires the assimilation of currently 
differentiated mala prohibita patterns of regulatory law and enforcement toward 
the mala in se model. Sutherland’s continuum of ‘assimilated’ and ‘differentiated’ 
criminal offending is the key theoretical lens through which the interview 
responses in this study are examined – categorised respectively within Part A(1) 
(‘Assimilation of Investigation Powers’) and Part B(1) (‘Differentiation of 
Investigation Powers’) of this article.  
It is noted that the rise in small business and the lowering of class barriers in 
certain professions since the 1970s25 might be seen to challenge the contemporary 
relevance of Sutherland’s theory regarding corporate and professional power, 
 
20  Pearce and Tombs (n 4) 107–10. 
21  Similar definitions are also provided by Ronald C Kramer, ‘Corporate Criminality: The Development of 
an Idea’ in Ellen Hochstedler (ed), Corporations as Criminals (Sage, 1984) 13–37; Steven Box, Power, 
Crime and Mystification (Tavistock Publications, 1983) 19–23.  
22  Gore v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2017) 249 FCR 167, 170–1 [3] (Dowsett and 
Gleeson JJ); DPP (Cth) v Poniatowska (2011) 244 CLR 408, 416–17 [20], 417–19 [24]–[25] (French CJ, 
Gummow, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
23  Sometimes referred to as ‘Hume’s Guillotine’.  
24  Tombs and Whyte (n 4) 125–43; Glasbeek (n 4). 
25  Michael Schaper, ‘A Brief History of Small Business in Australia, 1970–2010’ (2014) 3(2) Journal of 
Entrepreneurship and Public Policy 222, 223. See also Margaret Thornton, who discusses this process 
specifically in relation to the ‘declining status of lawyers’, precipitated by ‘deprofessionalisation, coupled 
with greater scrutiny and accountability’ as well as ‘the ‘massification’ of higher education and 
information technology’, in ‘The Australian Legal Profession: Toward a National Identity’ in William LF 
Felstiner (ed), Reorganisation and Resistance: Legal Professions Confront a Changing World (Hart 
Publishing, 2005) 133, 135. 
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particularly where small business has entered the arena of corporate regulation. 
This social change is reflected in ASIC enforcement statistics between 2016 and 
2019, indicating that coercive powers are conventionally exercised against smaller 
and less powerful businesses, while large and more powerful corporations mostly 
escape prosecution (discussed further in Part B(1) below).26 It must be 
remembered, however, that changing work patterns since the 1970s coincided with 
largescale labour market deregulation, casualisation and a growth in 
unemployment, driving some workers to seek subsistence work – work 
characterised by a legal designation as ‘small business’.27 When the enforcement 
statistics are read in this context, it is difficult to dispute the contemporary 
relevance of Sutherland’s work and that of other critical regulation scholars: that 
the crimes of the powerful continue to evade law enforcement (often at the expense 
of a social majority).  
Sutherland’s view that corporate crime must be treated as crime and taken 
more seriously by law-makers and enforcement officials, is echoed by modern 
regulatory theory, reverberating in the findings of Justice Kenneth Hayne in the 
Banking Royal Commission. As Hayne found, ASIC should place greater 
emphasis on ‘deterrence’ and ‘prosecution’ of corporate crime.28 This view builds 
upon the theoretical regulatory strategy known as ‘enforcement-backed 
compliance’,29 as well as basic paradigms of ‘responsive regulation theory’,30 and 
the lesser known, ‘really responsive regulation theory’.31 Problematically, 
however, these regulatory approaches lack a key element that Sutherland’s 
approach makes explicit: that at the heart of corporate wrongdoing are intractable 
forms of class power and privilege enabling white-collar criminals to not only 
evade the law, but to affect and prevent lawmaking and its enforcement. 
In this study, class power appeared to lie at the root of neoliberal policies 
associated with ‘regulatory capture’ and the persistent differentiation of corporate 
crime by senior management within the regulator, ASIC. As was apparent, the 
coercive legal power required to assimilate white-collar crime to conventional 
models of criminal law enforcement already exists. But as interviewees explained, 
the pervasive influence of neoliberal management policy, together with similarly 
politicised market regulation (‘compliance’-oriented regulation) from the top-
down within ASIC, has severely curtailed coercive enforcement practices. 
 
26  Australian Securities and Investment Commission, ‘Enforcement Outcomes’, Periodic Reports (Web 
Page) <https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/asic-investigations-and-enforcement/asic-enforcement-outcomes/> 
(‘Enforcement Outcomes’). 
27  Stephen Castles and Jock Collins, ‘Restructuring, Migrant Labour Markets and Small Business’, 
(Occasional Paper No 16, Centre for Multicultural Studies, University of Wollongong, June 1989) 13; 
Tomas Marttila, The Culture of Enterprise in Neoliberalism: Spectres of Entrepreneurship (Routledge, 
2013) 100–11. 
28  Banking Royal Commission (n 2) 424–46. 
29  Neil Gunningham, ‘Compliance, Deterrence and Beyond’ in LeRoy C Paddock, David L Markell and 
Nicholas S Bryner (eds), Compliance and Enforcement of Environmental Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2017) 63, 66; Tombs and Whyte (n 4) 153–7. The work of Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive 
Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University Press, 1992) was foundational to 
the development of this practice.  
30  Ayres and Braithwaite (n 29) 19–53.  
31  Robert Baldwin and Julia Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ (2008) 71(1) Modern Law Review 59.  
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Compounding this was the observation that institutional knowledge about effective 
use of coercive powers is rapidly fading.  
 
III THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
There are two key coercive powers available to ASIC to investigate corporate 
crime. ASIC may compel a person to either: (i) attend examinations and answer 
questions under oath (‘examination powers’);32 and/or (ii) produce specified 
documents (‘production powers’).33 Failure of a person to attend an examination 
and answer questions or produce a document is punishable by a fine or two years 
imprisonment.34 During an examination, a person may assert their privilege against 
self-incrimination (usually by saying the word ‘privilege’) before any answer that 
may incriminate them. Privileged interview answers cannot be used to prosecute a 
person in civil penalty or criminal proceedings.35 Such evidence may only be used 
to prosecute a person for giving false evidence.36 This loophole creates an 
immunity from prosecution that preserves the privilege against self-incrimination 
to a limited extent. It is known as ‘direct use immunity’.37 Nevertheless, it does not 
prevent ‘derivative use’ of the evidence – using the evidence to gain ‘leads’ to 
gather further evidence that may be crucial to a conviction.38 Nor does direct use 
immunity prevent investigators from using privileged evidence in court for another 
purpose such as to impugn a witness or defendant’s credibility, to show that the 
statement was a lie or to establish consciousness of guilt.39 Neither the privilege 
against self-incrimination, nor derivative and direct use immunities apply to a 
corporation as they have been held only to apply to a natural person who possesses 
 
32  ASIC Act 2001 (Cth) s 19. This section was often used as a verb by interviewees, eg, ‘we section 
nineteened him’.  
33  Ibid ss 30, 33.  
34  Ibid s 63.  
35  Ibid ss 68(2)–(3).  
36  Ibid. 
37  See, eg, A-G (Vic) v Riach [1978] VR 301, 310–11 (Kaye J) (‘Riach’); Smith v The Queen (2007) 35 
WAR 201, 226 [75] (Buss JA) (‘Smith’); Paul Sofronoff, ‘Derivative Use Immunity and the Investigation 
of Corporate Wrongdoing’ (1994) 10 Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 122, 125.  
38  In Riach, at 311, Justice Kaye contemplated the lawfulness of the derivative use of compelled evidence 
(investigative leads), saying that ‘[w]hat might be discovered from investigations made as a result of a 
witness's statement in the course of evidence, would not be a link in a chain of evidence’. In the same 
passage, however, his Honour excluded any direct use of that evidence to prosecute a witness, saying ‘… 
evidence given by the witness, which might provoke investigation, would be inadmissible in any 
prosecution against him’. This situation was codified by section 68(1) of the ASIC Act 2001 (Cth) – the 
purpose of which is to compel evidence from witnesses, in order to provide investigators with leads or 
derivative evidence while (under section 68(3)) prohibiting direct use of such evidence. In the process of 
codification, two exceptions to direct use immunity were added under ss 68(3)(c) and (d). These 
subsections permit the use of compelled evidence to show ‘the falsity of the statement’ or ‘the falsity of 
any statement contained in the record’. That is, compelled evidence (such as that created during an ASIC 
‘s 19 examination’ interview transcript) may be used against a person in court in criminal proceedings for 
these discrete and specific purposes, as recognised by Buss JA in Smith (at [75]). It is in this way that 
counsel use such false statements to impugn credibility etc. 
39  Smith (2007) 35 WAR 201, 226 [75] (Kaye J). 
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‘human’ rights.40 And neither may natural persons claim an evidential immunity in 
response to an ASIC request to produce documents or books.41 Indeed, there are 
few limitations on these powers, with the High Court treading lightly to ensure 
only that compulsory interviews are held before charges are laid, thereby merely 
reducing the possibility of forced confession.42 
Similar powers limiting silence rights now belong to a host of other Australian 
regulatory agencies such as the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(‘APRA’), the Department of Human Services (which includes Medicare and 
Centrelink), the Australian Tax Office (‘ATO’) and the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (‘ACCC’).43 In reviewing these powers, some have 
suggested that they have the potential to infringe universal human rights and 
individual civil liberties.44 Other commentators propose that such powers should 
be uniform across a range of regulatory agencies.45 Missing from both regulatory 
perspectives, however, is an understanding of power.46 Specifically, these 
perspectives fail to grasp how class power operates within corporate crime to 
thwart law enforcement, thereby necessitating stronger powers of investigation for 
specifically corporate regulatory agencies. Informed by a theoretical perspective 
that properly understands white-collar crime, agencies that regulate capitalism 
(such as those identified by corporate law scholar Thomas Middleton)47 should be 
equipped with different and stronger powers of investigation and enforcement. The 
social relations of corporate crime mean that coercive power is, to invoke 
Sutherland’s continuum or spectrum, well-assimilated to enforcing corporate 
criminal law. This article is not the appropriate forum to discuss investigation and 
enforcement powers of other, predominantly social welfare regulatory agencies, 
such as Medicare and Centrelink. However, a comparative approach to 
investigative powers between agencies based on understandings of social power is 
worthy of further study.   
 
 
40  Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477, 507–8 (Mason CJ 
and Toohey J). This common law authority is echoed by the Corporations Act, section 1316A, 
prohibiting corporations from claiming both the privilege against self-incrimination and the penalty 
privilege in criminal proceedings under the Act. Neither can a corporation be issued a section 19 
examination notice, although it can be issued a notice to produce books: Smorgon v Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1976) 134 CLR 475, 481–5 (Stephen J).  
41  ASIC Act 2001 (Cth) s 68(1). 
42  X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92, 110–11 [25]–[27] (French CJ and Crennan J)  
(‘X7’). 
43  ARC (n 1) 72–94. 
44  Ibid 2, 20–1; Joseph P Longo, ‘The Powers of Investigation of the Australian Securities Commission: 
Balancing the Interests of Persons and Companies under Investigation with the Interests of the State’ 
(1992) 10(4) Company and Securities Law Journal 237, 251; John Cotton, ‘Australia: Self-Incrimination 
in Company Legislation’ (1998) 19(6) Company Lawyer 182, 184. 
45  Thomas Middleton, ‘The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, the Penalty Privilege and Legal 
Professional Privilege under the Laws Governing ASIC, APRA, the ACCC and the ATO: Suggested 
Reforms’ (2008) 30 Australian Bar Review 282, 285.  
46  To be fair, Middleton’s suggestions for uniformity are limited to Commonwealth agencies that regulate 
capitalism.  
47  Middleton (n 45).  
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IV METHODS 
This study deployed qualitative research methods, relying on 14 semi-
structured interviews.48 Participants included former ASIC enforcement staff, 
investigators and corporate lawyers. Around half had held senior positions within 
the organisation and most had worked at ASIC over the past decade for between 
two and 25 years. Interviews were conducted by the researcher over a period of 
four months between late 2018 and early 2019, mostly at the workplaces of 
participants in Sydney, Adelaide, Melbourne and Brisbane. Each interview was 
roughly one hour in duration. 
Semi-structured interviews were an appropriate research method for this study 
because they allowed participants space to explore the interpretive and theoretical 
nature of enforcement practices.49 Data from interviews was sorted into fragments, 
organised around a thematic analysis of the assimilation and differentiation of 
white-collar crime.50 Qualitative claims by participants were checked against 
existing quantitative data on ASIC enforcement operations.51 Similar interview 
methods to those used here have, in fact, been used previously in relation to ASIC 
enforcement officials, albeit with a larger focus on enforcement patterns52 and 
penalties,53 rather than investigative powers. As qualitative methods expert David 
Silverman argues, interviews provide the researcher with a study of ‘experience’, 
often neglected by large, official inquiries and quantitative or numerical data.54 
 
A  Assimilation and Efficacy of ASIC’s Special Powers to Investigate 
Corporate Crime 
1 Assimilation of Investigation Powers 
Part A of this study examines how ASIC’s special powers are used, assessing 
whether they are effective to investigate corporate crime. This assessment is 
informed by an appraisal of how well ‘assimilated’ these powers are in treating 
white-collar offending as mala in se crime. The assimilation of these powers was 
pivotal to interviewee discussion of their experience using coercive powers and 
most prefaced their comments by providing a perspective on corporate crime, 
triggering further discussion on the fairness of the powers to suspects. Interviewees 
were also asked to appraise the strength and efficacy of the powers, as well as how 
 
48  Approved by the University of Technology Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee (ETH18-2582). 
49  Social science research methods expert, Alan Bryman, recommends semi-structured interviews in 
precisely these projects: Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press, 4th ed, 2012) 
208–12. 
50  Ibid 577–82. 
51  Ian Ramsay and Miranda Webster, ‘ASIC Enforcement Outcomes: Trends and Analysis’ (2017) 35(5) 
Company and Securities Law Journal 289; Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 
‘Enforcement Outcomes’ (n 26).  
52  Helen Bird et al, ‘ASIC Enforcement Patterns’ (Research Report No 71, Centre for Corporate Law and 
Securities Regulation, University of Melbourne, 2003).  
53  George Gilligan, Helen Bird and Ian Ramsay, ‘Regulating Directors’ Duties: How Effective Are the Civil 
Penalty Sanctions in the Australian Corporations Law?’ (Research Report, Centre for Corporate Law and 
Securities Regulation, University of Melbourne, 2004). 
54  David Silverman, Doing Qualitative Research (Sage, 5th ed, 2017) 5–20.  
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the investigation process was affected by legal representation – legal 
representation is known to affect the use of procedural rights in ‘street policing’. 
Throughout the study, some interviewees referred to regulatory strategies 
associated with ‘enforcement-backed compliance’. In addition, interviewees 
commented on their view of the ‘complexity’ of corporate crime – a common 
justification for the existence of coercive powers. 
 
2 Understandings of Corporate Crime 
Thirteen out of 14 interviewees acknowledged their role in prosecuting white-
collar crime. One senior manager reflected that corporate offenders ‘are totally 
different’55 to most criminal defendants by virtue of their wealth and power. ‘A 
company is set up to make money’, said one former investigator. ‘That’s ultimately 
its original purpose … directors of the company … will do what they can to make 
money but it’s up to the law to balance it out. With these ASIC powers, you're 
offsetting corporate power with investigative power’,56 they said. ‘Corporations 
will do what they want, they’re there to make the money’,57 said another. These 
views acknowledge an imbalance of power between the regulator and many large 
regulatees. As Glasbeek has asked:  
Should these giant corporations, whose use of market power amounts to a coercive 
use of force to enable them to appropriate a larger share of the socially produced 
wealth, not be held responsible for the inevitable impacts on the physical, emotional 
and cultural welfare of countless others?58  
A similar proposition was put to interviewees, most of whom actively agreed 
with this justification for prosecuting corporate criminality – although a handful of 
respondents were clear to distance themselves from the notion of that corporate 
power is inherently coercive.59  
 
3 Fairness to Suspects 
Understandings of the fairness of compulsory investigation powers echoed 
participants conceptions of corporate crime. For corporate lawyers among the 
respondents, these powers seemed ‘like a fundamental breach of the rule of law’.60 
These sentiments resonate with a libertarian literature, universally critical of 
coercive law.61 The power of this literature to achieve reform, particularly in the 
service of large corporate interests, should not be underestimated. In Canada, for 
instance, the Supreme Court used similar libertarian principles, in combination 
 
55  Interview with Anonymous 6 (Eugene Schofield-Georgeson, Sydney, 1 February 2019). 
56  Interview with Anonymous 10 (Eugene Schofield-Georgeson, Sydney, 12 February 2019).  
57  Interview with Anonymous 13 (Eugene Schofield-Georgeson, Sydney, 20 February 2019). 
58  Glasbeek (n 4) 61. 
59  Eight interviewees supported the statement while two clearly opposed it. Four neither agreed nor 
disagreed.  
60  Interview with Anonymous 3 (Eugene Schofield-Georgeson, Sydney, 28 November 2018); Interview 
with Anonymous 12 (Eugene Schofield-Georgeson, Sydney, 15 February 2019). 
61  Longo (n 44).  
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with a new constitutional Bill of Rights, to limit the coercive power of the 
corporate regulator.62  
A corollary perspective to this libertarian angle was an ‘authoritarian’ view, 
expressed by a former investigator who had also been a former police officer. 
Speaking of an interview in one of ASIC’s largest corporate prosecutions, they 
said 
basically the lawyers … would say, ‘well hold on a sec, this is a bit procedurally 
unfair’. To be honest, of course it’s fair. Because at the end of the day you're 
compelling someone to make an admission about what they’ve done, you know.63  
The problem with this perspective and the libertarian view is that they treat 
legal subjects as the same in all circumstances. As jurists such as Roberto Unger 
have observed, both libertarian and authoritarian understandings of law mask the 
significance of the social context in which offending occurs, 64 thereby failing to 
grasp the necessity of procedurally coercive laws when investigating powerful 
corporate suspects.  
By contrast, some interviewees made a connection between the strength of the 
powers as being assimilated to the social context at which they were targeted. As 
one of these respondents put it, ‘I think it has just been recognised that the 
difference with white-collar crime is if you allow that blank wall of silence then 
where are you going to get? Where are you gonna get?’ The respondent gave the 
example of fraud committed by a large bank, subject to the inquisitorial process of 
the Banking Royal Commission, to show the necessity of compulsory investigation 
powers in uncovering such crimes.65 Another said, ‘company directors need that 
compulsory power in order to be honest … that stick at the back end needs to 
maybe be a little bit sharper. But overall, the powers are proportional’ to the 
corporate crime that they were intended to investigate.66 The most senior 
investigator among the interviewees said,  
where you're taking action against a high profile white-collar person, probably 95 
percent of them are going to fight it. Whereas if you line that up alongside a typical 
garden variety police fraud type matter, it's probably the other way round: 90 
percent of people are going to plead. So yeah basically that's another layer and 
reason why you need to have these coercive powers. And it is not only to get as best 
you can the evidence but also to be able to at least have some opportunity to rebut 
whatever might be asserted by a very clever and highly paid defence counsel.67 
Here, interviewees bluntly considered the fairness of compulsory powers by 
comparing them with the social or class power of their suspects. Nevertheless, one 
of these interviewees added, ‘we tried to be fair to these people and made sure that 
they understood the consequences of giving the answers that they were giving’.68 
 
62  Thomson Newspapers Ltd v Canada [1990] 1 SCR 425; R v S (RJ) [1995] 1 SCR 451, 563–6, [196]–
[205] (Iacobucci J) and the ‘proportionality test’, outlined in the Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, sch B pt I. 
63  Interview with Anonymous 7 (Eugene Schofield-Georgeson, Sydney, 8 February 2019).  
64  Roberto Unger, Law in Modern Society (Free Press, 1976) 176–81, 192–223. 
65  Interview with Anonymous 2 (Eugene Schofield-Georgeson, Sydney, 28 November 2018).   
66  Interview with Anonymous 10 (n 56). 
67  Interview with Anonymous 6 (n 55). 
68  Interview with Anonymous 14 (Eugene Schofield-Georgeson, Adelaide, 25 February 2019).  
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Yet another cohort of interviewees admitted feeling uncomfortable about using 
compulsory powers, due to their perceived authoritarian associations. As a result, 
a good proportion of respondents conceded that compulsory powers are rarely used 
to their full extent. A senior manager who had worked at ASIC for over 20 years 
said, for instance, that they ‘never went into an interview thinking, “we’ll examine 
this guy and if he doesn’t answer questions, we’ll prosecute him”’. Such an 
approach, they explained, was counter-productive to the extraction of 
information.69 Instead, they said, ‘ASIC didn’t push the envelope in how it used 
those powers. It took a very consistent, conservative approach’. A further factor 
influencing this approach was the cautious ‘model litigant’ approach of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’). As the investigator put it, rather more 
colourfully, ‘they were scared shitless of [compulsory] examination transcripts’.70 
When it came to ‘grey lines’ about ‘rules around fairness’, said another, ‘it’s better 
to make evidence inadmissible rather than admissible’.71 Such is the restraint with 
which ASIC appears to use its compulsory powers that one of the corporate 
lawyers who described the powers as ‘odd’ and ‘disproportionate’ nevertheless 
commented that ‘ASIC … are pretty good … they’re pretty reasonable with [the 
powers] if it's clear that the person is claiming privilege’.72 In other words, despite 
the apparent strength of ASIC’s powers, investigators clearly do not abuse them 
by overuse or even manipulative use against suspects. 
 
4 Compulsory Investigation Process 
Interviewees, particularly those who had been ASIC investigators, gave an 
important array of insights into the use of compulsory powers. Beginning with the 
steps associated with the use of compulsory powers in the investigation process, a 
former senior investigator explained that, 
if it blows up the front page of paper … then ASIC does its surveillance … goes 
through and gets all their books and records there, gets a witness in for an 
examination … goes through the investigation process … and if the evidence 
doesn’t really stack up … chooses a course of action by seeking a remedy [either 
through a compliance process or prosecution].73  
Another explained that surveillance commenced when ASIC received ‘tip-offs 
from local police, or from APRA, other regulators, ACCC’ and mostly, 
‘complaints’; ‘That’s when they [start to] use some of these [special] powers’.74 
Compulsory powers to request documents are then used to initiate the surveillance, 
and ‘then you put together what you think your findings are on those documents’.75 
As a third investigator commented, ‘documents are brilliant because documents 
tell the story.76 This ability to know ‘the story’ before the interview, places 
investigators one step ahead of suspects. 
 
69  Interview with Anonymous 8 (Eugene Schofield-Georgeson, Sydney, 1 February 2019).  
70  Ibid; Interview with Anonymous 14 (n 68).  
71  Interview with Anonymous 10 (n 56). 
72  Interview with Anonymous 12 (n 60). 
73  Interview with Anonymous 2 (n 65). 
74  Interview with Anonymous 12 (n 60). 
75  Interview with Anonymous 9 (Eugene Schofield-Georgeson, Melbourne, 9 February 2019).  
76  Interview with Anonymous 6 (n 55).  
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Investigators distinguished between three types of ASIC interview, saying that 
interviews did not necessarily commence in a compulsory way. But if a suspect or 
witness would not speak, 
you wouldn’t have been able to put it in as blunt terms as, ‘if you don't answer, 
we’re going to take action’ … but you would draw their attention to the section of 
the legislation and say, ‘look you know this section allows us to prosecute you’.77 
Such a process is clearly very different to conventional policing process in 
which an interviewee is protected by silence rights. Nevertheless, as the 
interviewees explain (above), these processes are well-assimilated to prosecuting 
corporate crime as mala in se crime, owing to the wealth and power of corporate 
suspects that otherwise enables them to evade the law.  
Another investigator found that, ‘the compulsory process really got them in the 
room but you still have to get the words out of their mouth’.78 It was at this point 
that compulsorily seized documents became important, allowing investigators to 
show them to witnesses. ‘It’ll be a witness’s oral evidence of what they say about 
those documents’, said a former investigator, that forms the basis of the 
prosecution case.79 Another was more blunt. ‘The beauty of it is, he has to tell us 
what happened … now sometimes they’ll be like, “I can't remember it was a long 
time ago”. You’d bring up documents and they have to basically tell you’,80 they 
said. These comments demonstrate a vital synergy between compulsory powers to 
obtain documents and those of compulsory interview. 
Perhaps the most interesting observation about the use of compulsory powers 
was that they were rarely used to compel a suspect to confess in the interview 
room. As most investigators explained, ‘we were able to establish … all the 
material information relating to his wrongdoing, before [a suspect] came in’.81 
Another said, ‘by the time you actually interview the offender, mate you should all 
always have enough info … it’s very rare that you actually you go to the offender 
first and get that info … cops would do the exact same thing’.82 A third investigator 
discussed the strategy behind this process, explaining that when ASIC 
are after X … they’ll section 19 the PA, a business partner and maybe a client or 
two, some people around the edges, to get the info on X. And so X will be thinking, 
‘well it’s going to be me next’, you know, but it doesn't come, it never comes … 
that’s because they know that whatever X says, can't be used against him. So there’s 
no point right, they won’t bother with that. They want to get all the people around 
the edges because their privilege only protects them. It doesn’t protect X. They can 
use all that stuff against X.83 
In this practical respect, ASIC’s powers resemble conventional investigation 
techniques, perhaps more than their label, ‘extraordinary’, might suggest.  
However, as this interviewee explained, there were occasions when ASIC did 
in fact compel a confession from a suspect. When this happened, he explained, 
 
77  Ibid.  
78  Interview with Anonymous 14 (n 68). 
79  Interview with Anonymous 6 (n 55). 
80  Interview with Anonymous 12 (n 60). 
81  Interview with Anonymous 6 (n 55).  
82  Interview with Anonymous 7 (n 63). 
83  Interview with Anonymous 12 (n 60). 
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‘they’d have to go around the back and find a different way in. “Secondary use” 
they used to talk about’.84 A senior investigator conceded that, ‘no-one ever goes 
in and thinks “I’m gonna use this [interview] transcript to secure a conviction” 
[but] it may well be the fruit that the transcript bares that secures that conviction 
… its derivative use’.85 Nevertheless, the most senior of the investigators did 
describe using compulsory powers to wring a confession from a suspect in one of 
Australia’s largest corporate crime prosecutions:   
The best way of doing it is to compel them to come in … after an hour of parading 
our evidence, the person adjourned with their lawyer and said, ‘we'd like to assist 
you’. Now if I was a policeman with no powers of compulsion, do you think I'd 
have any chance of getting to that position? … no, because [police would] say 
‘come in we want to speak to you. It’s only voluntary and we’ll show you what 
we've got’ … the lawyer would just advise their client, ‘don't speak to them – you're 
not going to the police station’.86 
Compared to regular policing practices, these techniques can only be described 
as coercive, albeit necessary and well-assimilated to the investigation context of 
white-collar crime.  
Investigators also described testing the limits of compulsory powers. As one 
investigator put it, ‘how far you can go using compulsory powers, to make people 
actually sign a witness statement endorsing their transcript as being true and 
correct and getting it into court that way’.87 Again, the expertise of the most senior 
and experienced investigator was telling here. In convincing witnesses to sign and 
‘stick to’ their compulsory evidence, they described a process of requesting that 
the witness ‘write or reword their statement in any way they want … providing the 
witness sticks to the structure and framework and the relevance of what's in the 
statement’.88 The investigator inferred that this process gave the witness a sense of 
ownership over the statement, rendering it less likely to be challenged by the 
defence as ‘unreliable’ due to coercion.89 If witnesses deviated from this evidence 
in court, the evidence could be used to impugn the witness’s credibility. Indeed, as 
this investigator put it, ‘that’s the whole point’ of the process.90 
Other senior investigators described the foremost utility of compulsory 
interviews as providing investigators with ‘a feeling for what the defence could 
be’.91 In turn, they described ‘feeling out the defence as to where’s this guy gonna 
come from and exploring that with the defendant, building your case around it. 
That was what I saw as the biggest bang for buck. What are they gonna say’.92 
These insights are some of the first published observations by investigators 
about the use of coercive powers in this context. They demonstrate the utility of 
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compulsory powers in a corporate crime context and, as the next section explains, 
are greatly valued by their practitioners.  
 
5 The Strength and Efficacy of ASIC Investigation Powers 
Most interviewees acknowledged the strength of ASIC’s investigation powers, 
agreeing that such powers were ‘extraordinary’, endowing ASIC with ‘a wealth of 
powers to gather a wealth of information’.93 As one interviewee put it,  
the reality is, it is a power that the police don’t have. The police cannot compel 
someone to answer their questions. ASIC can. That is a fundamental difference. 
And yes, that important protection around self-incrimination is retained through 
privilege.94  
Another said: 
It is an intrusive power. They don’t need a warrant to issue a section 19 notice … 
and if used properly, it is a very powerful [and] extremely valuable investigative 
tool. It gets a hell of a lot of information in a very cheap, simple, effective and 
efficient manner. It focuses people's minds on answering the questions.95  
In this respect, most interviewees saw the powers as ‘absolutely effective’, 
‘always useful’, ‘a blessing’, ‘a very valuable tool and without compulsion, 
prosecutions would just fall over’.96 
Those who did not agree that the powers were ‘extraordinary’, explained that 
‘they’re just spot on’, to investigate ‘white-collar, educated, professional’ 
defendants – ‘not an overreach, that’s for sure’.97 On this point, a couple of 
interviewees referenced similar powers of ‘other regulators overseas and 
nationally’ to suggest that they were not ‘extraordinary’.98 One former investigator 
clearly appreciated the need to extend or assimilate interview powers in a 
specifically corporate context. After appraising them as ‘reasonable’ in respect to 
white-collar crime they said, ‘I’d never be a fan of the police getting these types 
of powers for ordinary criminal matters’.99  
One outlying perspective was that the powers were ‘odd’, ‘disproportionate’ 
and had ‘gone too far’.100 Another implied that the strength of these powers were 
in fact the cause of differentiation, laziness and complacency on the part of the 
regulator. ‘It’s great for ASIC’, they said. ‘It means it’s easy. When you start as a 
grad at ASIC they say “oh it’s fantastic, we can interview anyone and get what we 
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need”’.101 Both of these outlying views came from lawyers that now held positions 
as corporate defence counsel. 
Overwhelmingly, interviewees expressed the view that, ‘ASIC has got the 
powers to do what it wants’ – that its powers are sufficient.102 In this respect, 
ASIC’s powers are well-assimilated to investigating and prosecuting corporate 
crime, suggesting that the wealth and power intrinsic to corporate crime should be 
met with an equally powerful response by the State. Nevertheless, as the next 
section demonstrates, such powers tend to be opposed by libertarians and members 
of the legal profession.  
 
6 Legal Representation and the Interview Process 
During the compulsory interview process, examinees are afforded the right to 
counsel.103 Nevertheless, the role of the lawyer during the examination process is 
restricted: lawyers must not examine their client about any matters other than those 
raised by the ASIC investigator104 and investigators retain power to overrule the 
examinee’s choice of lawyer.105 When asked to estimate how frequently witnesses 
and suspects were legally represented in compulsory examinations, on average, 
respondents estimated that around 75% had legal representation. Most 
interviewees added that access to legal representation was almost always 
associated with the size of the firm at which the suspect was employed. One 
interviewee noted that some large Australian banks even had internal policies of 
paying ‘5,000 dollars’ to each employee to arrange for private legal representation 
in ASIC interviews. ‘Directors’, they said, ‘didn’t bother with lawyers because 
their [personal] interests were so aligned with the business’ that it was assumed 
their sophisticated and self-interested answers would always support the interests 
of the business.106 Respondents were also asked to estimate how often witnesses 
and suspects asserted the privilege against self-incrimination in interviews. On 
average, they said that the privilege was exercised regularly in 84% of cases – 
mostly when witnesses and suspects were legally represented. None had ever 
encountered a case where ASIC sought to restrict an examinee’s choice of legal 
representation. 
As to the effect of legal representation on the interview process, responses 
were mixed. Some respondents found that it ‘made it difficult for us’, ‘slowed us 
down’, ‘unnecessarily prolonged the process’ and that ‘top tier firms challenged 
us on every [interview] notice’.107 As one interviewee said ‘some [lawyers] will 
put on a bit of a show for their client, showing the client that their money’s well-
spent and they’ll treat it almost like a courtroom scenario where they’ll be 
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objecting to questions’.108 Another expressed annoyance at what they saw as a 
connection between ‘evasive’ suspects and higher tier legal representation.109 
These suspicions were confirmed by a corporate defence lawyer among the 
respondents who admitted that,  
we actively encouraged them to say as little as possible. Good memories weren't 
encouraged either … forgetfulness was a big thing … I said ‘if you’re going to take 
time to relax, you're better off relaxing in court … you’re walking into a pit of vipers 
here and everything you say is being documented and recorded and used against 
you in every single way possible’.110  
Some respondents who now worked as corporate defence counsel admitted that 
their goal was ‘to engage a settlement more than anything else’.111 Although as one 
former investigator admitted, defence lawyers ‘would sometimes raise issues with 
the way that evidence had been obtained under compulsory process … and that 
might influence the DPP to not proceed with the prosecution’.112 
The strength of the powers, on the other hand meant that a suspect’s failure to 
assert privilege under compulsory examinations frequently resulted in conviction. 
A senior investigator recalled how when a suspect attempted to show they ‘had 
nothing to hide’ by failing to claim privilege, ‘it was to their detriment. And … the 
transcript became pivotal in their prosecution’.113 Similarly, inconsistent use of 
privilege alerted investigators to criminal behaviour and in fact assisted them to 
frame the charge.114 As the same senior investigator recalled, aside from 
‘reminding their client to say privilege before answering a question, there’s not 
really much lawyers [can] do in examinations’.115 This situation may be contrasted 
with scholarship from the United Kingdom, showing that the biggest factor 
associated with use of the right to silence to defeat a criminal charge was the receipt 
of legal advice at a police station, which mostly encouraged suspects to remain 
silent.116 While the obfuscatory techniques discussed by corporate lawyers might 
be seen as a similar tactic, according to these investigators, ASIC’s coercive 
powers are fit for the task of ‘seeing through’ such contrivance. 
 
7 Understanding Enforcement-Backed Compliance 
A handful of investigators expressed a keen understanding of the theoretical 
design of the regulatory framework underpinning the ASIC and Corporations Acts, 
in which compulsory examinations play an important role. This approach, known 
as ‘enforced self-regulation’ or ‘enforcement-backed compliance’ involves 
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monitoring corporate compliance, backed by the threat of an increasing hierarchy 
or ‘pyramid’ of civil and criminal sanctions. It uses persuasion to enforce 
compliance where possible, followed by ‘incapacitation where deterrence fails’.117 
While not radically assimilated to the mala in se corporate crime control model 
discussed above, this regulatory approach is nevertheless, exceedingly more 
egalitarian than certain regulatory models, such as the ‘consensus’ or compliance-
only approach deployed in jurisdictions such as the UK.118 As one investigator said, 
cases are dealt with at different levels of ‘a pyramid’, depending on their 
seriousness and the strength of the evidence.119 Recalling the well-known ‘carrot 
and stick’ metaphor used by Ayres and Braithwaite to describe the programme of 
‘enforcement-backed compliance’, another investigator spoke of the compulsory 
investigation powers as forming part of the ‘stick at the back end’ of the process.120 
Explaining the process along similar lines to Braithwaite and Fisse,121 another said 
that where the regulator is ‘not adequately resourced to take on the big four banks’ 
by subjecting their executives to compulsory examination, ‘we just select the cases 
that we need to’ and make an example out of them.122 
 
8 Complexity of ASIC Investigations  
One of the most frequent observations confirming that ASIC’s compulsory 
powers are well-adapted to the investigation of corporate crime was that the 
powers enabled law enforcement officials to enquire into the peculiarly complex 
nature of white-collar crime and ‘large complex organisations’.123 Interviewees 
commented that such complexity renders ‘white-collar or financial crime … a very 
incredibly difficult thing to prosecute’,124 and ‘seriously hard to prove’.125 As some 
of the earliest law reform commentary on the need for compulsory corporate 
investigation powers recognised, complexity in corporate crime stems from a 
range of factors including the volume of evidence, the indeterminate and 
specialised nature of the facts, limited liability of companies, and multiple victims 
in white-collar cases.126 These factors were an indelible part of the investigation 
experience of most interviewees. 
As to the volume of evidence in corporate investigations, ‘we’re talking about 
literally hundreds of thousands of documents’, said one investigator. ‘There might 
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be 50 pieces to the puzzle but you might only have 30 of them’, he explained. 
Demonstrating the indeterminacy of this puzzle, this investigator said, ‘when you 
put those thirty in front of a jury, you’re effectively asking a jury, “what do you 
think is in those missing pieces?” and if you’ve got the right pieces there already, 
they’re going to know what they see’.127 As Sutherland has explained, 
differentiation of white-collar crime results in part from its complexity which, in 
turn, stems from the ability of corporate offenders to hire lawyers and lobby 
governments to manipulate and obfuscate law in their own interests.128  
Limited liability or the corporate veil is Sutherland’s classic example of 
manipulation of law to protect white-collar criminality.129 Interviewees referred to 
the ‘corporate veil’ as another obfuscatory factor in corporate criminal 
investigation that justifies coercive powers.  
You're offsetting against the kind of inherent complexity of what you're 
investigating and the otherwise kind of privileged position that the person has 
actually been given [through] things like the corporate veil [which] immediately 
puts up a wall that prevents prosecution … or makes it extremely difficult to 
prosecute individuals 
said one former investigator.130 Other interviewees described this quid pro quo 
relationship or social contract as a form of ‘social licensing’.131 ‘If you don't want 
the … license … just don’t run a business’, said another.132 Conceiving of this 
process as one of licensing contains an inherent acknowledgement that there is 
something harmful about corporate profit-making, necessitating regulation. 
Glasbeek identifies this harm as involving ‘the private accumulation of socially 
produced wealth’, in a manner that is not only lawful, but protected by complex 
law.133  
A related issue of complexity was best explained by a senior investigator-
turned corporate barrister, who said,  
making, building a white-collar case is really, really difficult. You know, a murder 
case … he didn’t put the knife in his own back. Somebody put it there and that is 
inherently an unlawful thing. These white-collar things, market manipulation, 
insider trading stuff, for example. The basic issue is ‘has an offence been 
committed?’ The criminal law analogy is rape – where sexual acts are not illegal, 
but if you have a particular intent and you carry out the sexual act in a particular 
way, then it can be highly illegal. Trading on the share market is not illegal. We 
want people to go and have sexual relations or else the human race is done and we 
want people to trade on the share market but if you trade in a certain way and with 
a certain intent, that is then all of a sudden a serious illegal act. Rape is the hardest 
crime to prove. It's the same with these intent-based white-collar crimes.134 
He added that the elaborate nature of corporate defences – some of which 
might turn on the interpretation of a word in company prospectus – all added to 
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the complex indeterminacy of corporate crime.135 These complexities directly 
resonate with Sutherland’s definition of white-collar crime in which acts that are 
technically lawful, could and should be criminalised due to their inherent 
dishonesty and often exploitative consequences.136  
Coming from the opposite political direction, one corporate defence lawyer 
among the interviewees insinuated that such indeterminacy meant that corporate 
crime was arbitrary and hence, illegitimate. As they put it,  
One of the great tensions in corporate law trials is you have to balance the court 
second guessing management decisions in which these people are usually experts. 
‘You bought this type of wood and not that type of wood and it bankrupted the 
company. How dare you!’ We don’t know enough about wood so, a criminal trial. 
You know, ‘beyond all reasonable doubt, should they have bought the other wood?’, 
seems like an absolute nonsense. … I can’t see many instances where [a legitimate 
conviction] could be done … So unless you had outrageously self-interested 
behaviour, that’s simply not going to happen. Most of these corporate cases are mild 
negligence, inattentiveness, minor moments of greed. The problem is that minor 
moments of greed in charge of huge monstrous organisations have huge 
consequences for those little actions.137 
The final aspect of complexity raised by interviewees concerned the element 
of multiple victims often affected by corporate offending – an aspect commonly 
associated with increasing the ‘gravity’ or mala fides of conventional criminal 
offending. The number of ‘witness statements’ generated by the ‘widespread 
impact’ involved with corporate offending, said one interviewee, ‘justifies ASIC 
having those powers’.138 Citing examples of banking conduct from the Banking 
Royal Commission, one interviewee said that these corporate suspects commit 
crime that ranges ‘across all of Australia and it’s just the breadth of their impact’ 
that means the powers are ‘proportionate to the work that ASIC is trying to do’.139 
In response to the combined complexities surrounding issues of volume of 
evidence, indeterminacy and limited liability, senior investigative officials were 
emphatic that the work of ASIC ‘would be hampered, without those powers’.140  
 
B Differentiation and Under-Enforcement of Corporate Crime Related 
to ASIC’s Special Powers 
1 Differentiation of Investigation Powers 
Just as interviewees discussed assimilation of investigative powers to 
corporate crime, so too did they explain how these powers are differentiated from 
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the enforcement of regular criminal law, outlined in here in Part B of this article. 
Most agreed that while ASIC has very strong powers assimilated to the 
enforcement of corporate crime, the powers are rarely used, meaning that corporate 
criminal law remains under-enforced. Under-enforcement was a key point 
recognised recently by the Banking Royal Commission. ‘ASIC’s starting point’, 
said Commissioner Hayne, ‘appears to have been: “How can this be resolved by 
agreement?”’, rather than asking ‘whether a Court should determine the 
consequences of a contravention’ – whereas the ‘starting point’ required by ‘the 
rule of law’ is that ‘the law is to be obeyed and enforced’, while ‘adequate 
deterrence of misconduct depends upon visible public denunciation and 
punishment’.141 Counsel assisting the Banking Royal Commission pointed out this 
differential treatment between corporate crime and ‘street crime’ in a question to 
the current ASIC Chairman, saying, ‘The parking inspector doesn't seek an 
indication from the person he’s giving a parking fine to as to whether they will 
accept and pay it. He just does it. Why don’t you just do that?’142 
This suggestion translated into a key observation in the Banking Royal 
Commission final report that, ‘the critical question whenever ASIC is considering 
any contravention of the law must be … “Why not litigate?”’143 ASIC’s official 
answer to this question had previously been associated with compliance-based 
prosecution practice, supported by a large regulatory literature emphasising 
‘improved regulatory outcomes’ through ‘mutual trust’ between regulators and 
regulatees, backed by gentle regulatory ‘suasion’ involving negotiation of 
agreements, promises and ‘enforceable undertakings’.144 Given the extent of 
corporate criminality uncovered by the Banking Royal Commission, however, it 
was clear that these strategies had failed, weakening, rather than strengthening, the 
relationship between regulator and regulatee. These results reinforced 
Commissioner Hayne’s recommendations that compliance strategy should not be 
contemplated without first considering prosecution and its attendant deterrent 
outcomes – both specific and general.145 
Despite recognising ASIC’s differential treatment of corporate crime and 
prosecution strategy, the Banking Royal Commission did not engage with its 
institutional causes. In this study, interviewees identified a range of reasons for 
differentiated patterns of enforcement. Most associated a neoliberal political 
agenda and polices of deregulation and austerity with failure to use coercive 
investigative powers. Interviewees consistently mentioned how funding and 
staffing polices, as well as formal enforcement policy (ironically, directed against 
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enforcement) led to the regulatory ‘capture’ of ASIC by wealthy and powerful 
business interests and, in turn, minimal use of its coercive investigation powers. 
Empirical studies on ASIC enforcement between 2011 and 2016 do not 
indicate any substantive decline in prosecutions, and hence the use of ASIC’s 
investigative powers.146 Nevertheless, when small business prosecutions are 
subtracted from these enforcement outcomes, only 30% of ASIC investigations 
result in criminal sanctions, with the remainder comprising banning and licensing 
actions and enforceable undertakings.147 As interviewees made clear, ASIC rarely 
uses its extraordinary powers in such matters because it is rarely required to 
produce strong evidence to secure these ‘compliance’ measures.148 As one 
interviewee put it, compliance measures are negotiated ‘because ASIC wants to 
try and get a nice quick easy result’.149 As the foregoing explains, these 
differentiated outcomes are the result of neoliberal austerity measures and 
deregulation.  
 
2 Resourcing  
Differentiated use of investigation powers through under-enforcement is 
typically the result of inadequate funding resulting from neoliberal austerity 
measures.150 Over the past decade, both Labor and Liberal Party governments have 
cut funding to ASIC.151 Former Prime Minister Tony Abbott introduced the most 
severe cuts in 2014, stripping $120 million from the ASIC bottom-line.152 Since 
the Banking Royal Commission, this money has been restored, with additional 
resources allocated to the regulator.153 As interviewees explained, limited resources 
restricted the use of coercive powers, in some cases rendering the organisation 
subject to ‘capture’ by large, powerful and wealthy corporate interests.154  
At the time of the Abbott Government cuts, one investigator recalled that, 
‘ASIC was always brutally made aware of the fact that you're using public funds’ 
which even affected ‘very minute, low level decisions about stationery’. They 
explained that on such a budget, when ‘you start investigating and opening doors 
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to do big things’ and ‘you think that you might get knocked back [on the 
prosecution] anyway’, that ‘ASIC’s first position’ becomes ‘how do we settle 
this?’155 As another put it, ‘it’s about trying to do as much as they can with the 
resources they've got’.156 Almost all interviewees expressed a view that valuable 
investigative resources are allocated to other areas of ASIC’s overly broad 
regulatory charter of operations – a view that, ‘ASIC does far too much’157 while 
its ‘remit is getting wider and wider’.158  
But even with adequate funding, standard regulatory operations are limited by 
government resources. As another investigator put it, ‘when you’re a corporate 
regulator with limited resources and you’re pitted against all the big banks with 
almost infinite resources, it’s almost always very hard to win’.159 Junior 
investigators expressed reluctance to prosecute while feeling intimidated by the 
wealth and power of corporate investigatees.160 Against large corporate interests, 
ASIC ‘knows what’ll happen’, said another, – ‘it will be wrapped up in years of 
defence’.161 Citing ASIC’s largely fruitless prosecution of OneTel Corporation 
around a decade ago, interviewees spoke of the ‘risk’, ‘waste of resources’ and 
collective demoralisation associated with losing corporate prosecutions, which in 
the OneTel case were compounded by a costs order against the regulator.162 In this 
way, limited resources have seen the regulator refrain from exercising its powers, 
rendering it captive to large, wealthy and powerful interests, an inequality of 
resources that differentiates it from conventional police forces.  
 
3 Staffing Policy and Skills Decline 
Neoliberalism is commonly associated with the politics of ‘short-termism’ – 
short-term planning and decision-making for short-term private financial gains, 
often at the expense of good social governance and long-term economic 
prosperity.163 Neoliberal management at ASIC has followed this trajectory in 
respect to staffing policies which have, in turn, impacted significantly upon the 
exercise of ASIC’s special powers. At the same time as increasing the numbers of 
senior executive staff with solid finance sector credentials, sympathetic to large 
corporate interests, ASIC has systematically ‘downsized’ the number of 
experienced investigative staff who, between them, maintained important 
institutional knowledge about ASIC’s special investigative powers.   
Senior investigators claimed that the problem of under-enforcement was not 
one of resourcing but ‘skills, they’re lacking skills’, said one. ‘You can give ASIC 
a thousand [new] staff if you want but if they don’t have the skills, they’re not 
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gonna be able to do it’.164 Others expressed similar views but were also critical of 
what they saw as a misallocation of funds on more management and free market 
policy.165 As another senior investigator said,  
recently it was announced that ASIC had increased the number of managers or 
senior executives. For me, that’s crazy. It’s not about increasing penalties or 
increasing powers it’s making sure your workforce is properly trained and the right 
numbers are there to do the job rather than increasing the number of managers. For 
me that was madness.166 
Disagreeing that ASIC was ‘underfunded’, this investigator continued, saying, 
‘I look around the organisation and you’ve got all these teams and what do they 
actually accomplish?’ Singling out one former ASIC Chairman, they said, 
I remember that his key thing was what he called ‘facilitating capital market flows’. 
And I used to say, ‘What the hell does that actually mean? Where does it say in 
ASIC’s charter or the Act that we’re set up to do that!’ I’m all for surveillance 
teams.167  
They were moved to anger at the way in which a certain ASIC Chairman had 
offered ‘redundancies’ to experienced members of the enforcement team, for 
whom ‘he had near contempt’. The ‘redundancies’, said this senior investigator, 
were ‘aimed purely at enforcement and some damned good people went as a result 
of that. I remember thinking at the time, “what the hell! This is madness! How can 
you be gutting enforcement!’168 Such sentiments are an entirely rational response 
to neoliberal policy in which practices of state-based market regulation are 
themselves informed not by traditional legal concepts such as fairness and formal 
equality, but by predatory and unpredictable market logic – what economist, David 
Harvey, has recently called ‘the madness of economic reason’.169 
Senior investigators were replaced with executives and corporate lawyers who 
‘had no relevant experience in this space.’ The same senior investigator spoke of 
‘incompetence’ and a ‘total lack of experience’ in senior ranks, saying that ‘some 
of the suggestions’ to the investigation and enforcement teams ‘were, to be quite 
blunt, garbage, inane, inane’.170 The interviewee continued, saying that ‘knowledge 
of markets’ did not translate into knowledge of ‘how to go about prosecuting in 
the market’, resulting in ‘embarrassing’ decisions by the senior executive. ‘If I had 
very junior staff … [who] had suggested’ certain decisions made by the senior 
executive, the interviewee said, ‘I would have had a very stern word with them, 
saying, “that’s a preposterous suggestion”’. In this respect, differentiation of 
corporate crime from regular crime was not inherently ‘cultural’ among 
investigators. Rather, it was engineered from the top-down. This former 
investigator blamed a particular ASIC Chairman whose policies ‘significantly 
advanced the skill set drain that we’re seeing’, leading the organisation to 
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‘plummet’.171 The most senior of the investigators emphasised a lack of skills 
among junior staff, hired to replace older, experienced investigators whose jobs 
had apparently been made redundant.172  
The most noticeable consequence of this skill drain affected the use of coercive 
investigation powers. As the most experienced investigator said, during 
interviews, ‘you need to make sure that the right questions are asked, in order to 
meet the elements of the offence. Section 19s … were often in the hands of quite 
junior practitioners’ and either ‘the right questions weren’t asked’ or inexperienced 
investigators ‘were railroaded by the defendant’s lawyer’.173 This investigator had 
performed over 400 compulsory examinations and spoke at length about the 
‘safest’ and most unimpeachable ways to conduct the interview.174 Similarly, in 
reviewing compelled documentary evidence, they said, ‘a rookie investigator 
would’ not necessarily ‘understand exactly what they’ve got and whether there are 
gaps’. Most, said this senior investigator, are not ‘actually carefully reviewing’ 
compelled material ‘because they don’t know yet what to look for’.175 They 
emphasised the importance of training and learning these skills over time – often 
over the space of a five to 20-year career. It is precisely such a career trajectory 
that short-term ASIC staffing policy has obliterated, along with the ability to 
master the use of the institution’s special investigation powers.  
 
4 Internal Enforcement Policy 
Enforcement policy within ASIC is a further factor differentiating its use of 
coercive investigation powers. Such policy reflects broader neoliberal institutional 
goals of deregulation that appear synchronised with powerful and wealthy 
interests. This synchronicity emerged during the 2013 federal election campaign 
agenda of right-wing Liberal Party Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, who promised a 
deregulated, minimalist, neoliberal state, embodied by a sloganeering pledge to 
‘cut red tape’ or, rather, business regulation.176  
One interviewee admitted to being ‘disgusted’ by ASIC ‘market releases about 
how they’re cutting red tape’. Pointing to the emphatically politicised nature of 
these statements, they said, ‘reasonable people can disagree about the appropriate 
level of regulation in a particular area of the economy but ASIC’s calling it “red 
tape”, calling regulation “red tape” is a value judgement’, that is antithetical to the 
very existence of the regulator.177 Again, this interviewee made a connection 
between wealthy and powerful interests and neoliberal government policy, 
internalised by ASIC. ‘Maybe, you’re actually scrapping regulations that are well 
crafted to protect investors and stakeholders,’ they said, ‘and you’re only doing it 
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because you’ve been lobbied by financial services firms’.178 Other interviewees 
were somewhat less critical of the links between capital and the state, opting 
instead for traditional liberal explanations of failures to exercise investigation 
powers that largely blamed or failed to look beyond, ‘big government’. ‘It was a 
big bureaucracy and we always seemed to prosecute those really, really easy cases 
or those cases that weren’t really big firms’, said one.179 ‘Honestly, I think it’s that 
they have an adverse risk approach and I think that just has developed within the 
culture’ and now ASIC ‘rarely prosecutes’, said another.180 Much like the critique 
that emerged from the Banking Royal Commission, these perspectives did not look 
below the surface of institutional under-enforcement to the guiding hand of 
neoliberal strategy.  
Nevertheless, these views yielded further detail about ASIC’s enforcement 
policy. After writing enforcement policy at ASIC, one senior investigator 
explained that ASIC did not say, ‘this conduct is not acceptable. We think it’s 
illegal. Don’t do it’. ASIC would instead say, ‘although these arrangements may 
not be illegal, we have some concerns’.181 In this respect they criticised 
deregulation-styled policies of ‘compliance’ which they said gave ‘ASIC a 
peculiar personality where it’s trying to be really helpful but at the same time … 
hedges its bets … making enforcement more difficult’.182 As long-time scholars of 
ASIC policy such as Vicky Comino have realised, enforcement is not actually an 
objective of such compliance-oriented corporate regulation.183  
Unsurprisingly perhaps, compliance-oriented enforcement strategy was 
endorsed by corporate lawyers among the interviewees. More concerning, 
however, were views on enforcement powers attributed to a past ASIC Chairman 
by one of these lawyers, with whom the lawyer claimed to have worked closely. 
‘His view was that ASIC was instilled with too much power’, turning ‘a 
supposedly responsive regulator … into quite an aggressive beast’, the lawyer 
said.184 This tendency toward deregulation was paraded publicly in the approach 
of another recent ASIC Chairman, Greg Medcraft, a former banker specialising in 
the securitisation of non-mortgage assets (or ‘credit default swaps’ (‘CDS’)) in 
Europe and later, North America, throughout the 1990s until 2006.185 The 
proliferation of CDS in the United States during the leadup to the Global Financial 
Crisis (‘GFC’) in 2007 relied upon deregulation of anti-trust laws following active 
lobbying by major proponents within the industry. The de-regulation of CDS has 
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been widely cited as a cause of the GFC.186 Following the GFC, Medcraft returned 
to Australia. He was appointed ASIC Chairman shortly after. 
Senior investigators provided examples of how deregulatory approaches 
resulted in failure to prosecute and use coercive powers. In a follow-up ‘off the 
record’ interview, one of the most senior investigators spoke of how ASIC 
investigators discovered that one of Australia’s largest banks had ‘stolen or 
misappropriated billions of dollars from term deposit accounts’.187 When it was 
brought to the attention of ASIC’s highest ranking officials, the corporate 
watchdog declined to prosecute188 – even after receiving affirmative written legal 
advice from two separate senior counsel. As the interviewee put it, ‘we were never 
going to lose’. Similarly, another former investigator spoke of providing a detailed 
tip-off to ASIC on a $35 million dollar investment fraud case, disclosing all 
relevant details of offences, including transactions, accounts, emails. ‘I basically 
wrapped this up, gave it to them and all they had to do was just issue some section 
19 notices, call these people and get them to produce documents and financial 
statements and they’d have a prosecution’, they said.189 ASIC failed to act. As 
another investigator explained, ‘if, for example, it was going to take Catherine 
Brenner (former Chair of AMP) in … for an interview, that might look 
embarrassing to ASIC, or there could be questions, or it could raise eyebrows, so 
I don’t think they ever did that’.190 
 
5 Capture of ASIC 
Some of the most extraordinary examples of ASIC’s regulatory capture were 
cited by a former ASIC legal officer-turned-whistleblower. The first example 
involved what they described as ‘a full court press from lobbying groups like the 
Financial Services Council … trying to get ASIC to change the law to benefit it’. 
These amendments, they said were ‘just rammed through in circumstances where 
I thought ASIC just didn't have the power to do it’. When this respondent spoke 
out against these dealings to the most senior legal officials within ASIC, they were 
told that ‘saying “no” just wasn’t an option’ and that continued resistance risked 
not only their job but their admission as a solicitor in NSW.191  
When a superannuation fund lobbied ASIC to repeal fee disclosure obligations 
for online superannuation calculators, ASIC established ‘a dedicated team’ to deal 
with their submissions. The team included the lawyer from the same 
superannuation fund (now head of a major investment bank) who had drafted the 
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correspondence lobbying ASIC to change the laws.192 ASIC senior managers 
dismissed the whistleblower’s concerns that such an apparent conflict of interest 
constituted a criminal offence under the ASIC Act.193 And when a major investment 
bank lobbied ASIC to legalise what the whistleblower referred to as, ‘a largescale 
tax dodge’, ASIC could provide only the most feeble of responses. The interviewee 
described how the major law firm representing the bank ‘misrepresented the law’ 
and ‘the way their scheme operated’. ASIC very nearly capitulated, were it not for 
his insistence against legalising the scheme. Upon suggesting to ASIC senior 
management that the firm be admonished for its improper legal practice and 
disrespect toward the regulator, the whistleblower was reprimanded as being 
‘crazy’, given the wealth, power and prestige of both the firm and their client.194 
This interviewee did not see the problem in terms of corruption but merely as 
reflecting the ‘extreme political power’ of ‘a very powerful, wealthy set of people 
who are lobbying for this stuff’ in a ‘very aggressive, very assertive’ way, showing 
that they had ‘infinite resources, infinite lawyers’.195 These anecdotes clearly 
illustrate largescale differentiation in ASIC’s enforcement of corporate crime – in 
particular, Sutherland’s observation that white-collar criminals are equipped not 
only to evade the law but to change it in their own interests.196  
After the percolation of neoliberal management strategies discussed above, 
other interviewees described an entrenched culture of capture. The regulator is now 
‘filled with people who have worked either for the large law firms or for the large 
banks or they go back and forth … and they're all pals!’, said one.197 ‘There is a 
culture of … looking after the big end of town’, said another,198 and ‘if you're big 
enough, you usually get an RM [relationship manager]’. Relationship managers 
are ASIC employees who manage the compliance affairs of ‘all the big 
stockbroking firms, banks, investment banks’.199 This mutually embedded culture 
of compliance between large firms and the regulator is far removed from the 
practical experience of investigators tasked with using coercive powers against 
corporate crime. Such regulatory capture is so different from the policing of street 
crime that it might easily be mistaken for the state-sanctioned equivalent to police 
corruption.  
 
• V CONCLUSION 
ASIC’s special powers are, undoubtedly, fit for the purpose of investigating 
corporate crime and assimilated to the task of treating it as such. In the interviews 
undertaken here, investigators and others described, for the first time, how such 
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powers are used and to what effect. But interviewees also explained that these 
procedural powers are subject to political manipulation, often by forces that 
operate high above the heads of individual investigators. In this respect they raised 
a range of significant issues concerning the operations of ASIC that differentiate 
coercive powers from conventional powers of street policing.  
The Federal Government’s response to the Banking Royal Commission 
findings against ASIC’s problems with differentiated enforcement have been 
mixed. On the one hand, the Morrison Government has been forthcoming with an 
injection of funding, replacing what has been stripped-out of the organisation by 
recent neoliberal austerity measures. On the other hand, enforcement options have 
been further differentiated, with the creation of more lenient civil penalty and 
‘quasi-criminal’ options for dealing with corporate crime.200 Accordingly, the 
advice and outcomes of the Banking Royal Commission may not result in any 
greater assimilation of enforcement practices by ASIC, unless the regulator 
prosecutes corporate crime using existing offence provisions that have more 
serious, criminal consequences. In turn, such offences require proof of more 
serious offending201 and ASIC’s special powers are well-equipped and assimilated 
to the task of collecting such evidence. Whether these powers are in fact used in 
this way, will depend on a response to the problems of differentiation, discussed 
above. In addressing these issues, investigators require a discrete set of skills.  
As this article has argued, supported by qualitative evidence, these skills and 
the institutional knowledge about how to use them that had accrued within ASIC 
over time, have largely been lost to a short-sighted neoliberal political agenda. This 
is an agenda that has ascribed primacy to the goals of austerity and market freedom 
at the expense of the longevity and fairness of the market (discussed in Part B). No 
amount of ‘quick-fix’ prosecution policy and funding restoration can solve this 
problem in the short-term. Also demonstrated here is that ASIC management have 
actively inculcated a culture of compliance, discouraging assimilated enforcement 
and deterrent strategies of prosecution and coercive investigation. Broader 
institutional and political change is needed within the regulator for its coercive 
investigation powers to be properly assimilated to the task of enforcing the law 
against corporate crime. Precise policies geared toward this goal require further 
research from a critical regulation perspective.202 Nevertheless, change begins with 
abandoning polices of deregulation which, as demonstrated here, have assisted 
 
200  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1317E, as inserted by Treasury Laws Amendment (Strengthening 
Corporate and Financial Sector Penalties) Act 2019 (Cth) sch 1 item 116; NSW Society of Labor 
Lawyers, ‘Post-Hayne: The State of Financial Regulation in Australia’ (YouTube, 28 April 2019) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lPvUHxj3dXo>.  
201  See, eg, offences requiring proof of ‘actual dishonesty’. 
202  A key avenue of further research arising from this study is the overly cautious treatment of compulsory 
interview material by the DPPs and courts – both bodies appear to either misunderstand white collar 
crime or disapprove of the sociological justification for these powers. A further issue was confusion 
surrounding the use and justification of coercive powers by some ASIC investigators and senior 
managers. Yet another concerned restraint against use of compulsory powers out of consideration for the 
best interests of victims of corporate crime. Interviewees also raised a raft of suggestions to more 
effectively assimilate the use of ASIC’s special powers of investigation. 
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wealthy and powerful interests to commit corporate crime, in part, by capturing 
the regulator. 
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